








Fraud on the Market:  Analysis of the Efficiency of the 
Corporate Bond Market 
 
Cindy A. Schipani 
Stephen M. Ross School of Business  
University of Michigan 
 
H. Nejat Seyhun 
Stephen M. Ross School of Business  
University of Michigan 
 
Michael Hartzmark 






Ross School of Business Working Paper 





This work cannot be used without the author's permission.  
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the  




Fraud on the Market:  Analysis of the Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market+ 
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 The efficiency of the corporate bond market is not well understood.   Although many of 
the factors used to analyze stock market efficiency translate with some adjustments to corporate 
bond markets, the cause-effect factor is not intuitive and can be a source of significant confusion.  
In this paper we analyze bond market efficiency in the context of a recent court decision.    
The U.S. District Court, in In re American International Group, Inc. Securities Litigation 
(AIG) was asked to certify as a class claims of lead plaintiffs against American International 
Group (AIG) and various other defendants for a number of violations of the securities laws.1  
The gist of lead plaintiffs’ claims is that the defendants made material misstatements and 
omissions in AIG’s financial statements which caused artificial inflation of the valuation of 
AIG’s financial assets.2  Investors who purchased the securities at the inflated prices thus 
claimed to be harmed when the prices fell upon revelation of the omissions and misstatements.3  
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1 265 F.R.D. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
2 Id. at 157-166. 
3 Id. at 166. 
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The court certified a class of equity holders but denied lead plaintiffs’ request for certification 
with respect to a class of AIG bondholders.4   
 This decision, in which the court held there was insufficient evidence to support a 
conclusion that $1.71 billion in AIG bonds, traded in open, developed and efficient markets, has 
serious implications for the corporate bond market.  The finding that the publicly-traded bonds of 
the world’s largest insurance company with over $100 billion in revenues, $850 billion in assets, 
$85 billion in shareholders’ equity, and $750 billion in debt and other liabilities, listed on three 
international exchanges – the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
and the Irish Stock Exchange– and serviced over 60 million customers, raises the question 
whether, based on this precedent, a court could find that any corporate bonds could possibly 
trade in open, developed and efficient markets.5  At best, the court’s decision reduces AIG 
bondholder rights.  At worst, it effectively precludes investors in the $7.4 trillion corporate bond 
market6 from the opportunity to utilize class actions as a means to recover legitimate economic 
losses.  An ancillary consequence of this decision is that if bondholders are left without recourse 
for recovery of legitimate claims, additional risks will be transferred from issuers to investors,7 
likely resulting in an increase in the costs of capital for bond issuers.8 
                                                            
4 Id.  
5 American International Group, Inc., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (Form 10-K)  (Mar. 16, 2006).  
6 Note that the bond market is only slightly smaller in size than the United States Treasury Market of $8.9 trillion.  
See SEC. INDUS.  AND FIN. MARKETS ASS’N, OUTSTANDING U.S. BOND MKT. DEBT (last updated Dec. 16, 2010), 
http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/StatisticsFiles/CM-US-Bond-Market-Outstanding-
SIFMA.xls.     
7  See Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On Financial Contracting:  An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 
(1979).   
8  “If the probability of a complete wealth transfer to stockholders prior to required payments to bondholders is 1, 
then the bonds will sell for a zero price.” Id. at 119. 
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As analyzed below, the decision turned on an evaluation of whether the bond market in 
which the AIG bonds traded is open, developed and efficient.9  Unfortunately, in determining 
that the bonds were not traded in an open, developed and efficient market, and thus not finding 
“questions of law or fact common”10 to the class of bondholders, the court failed to sufficiently 
adjust the analysis of factors commonly used for determining whether common stock is traded in 
an efficient market to account for the trading of corporate bonds.  This paper proposes a 
comprehensive analysis that takes into account the differences between the stock and bond 
markets.  Specifically, the factors courts have found indicative of an efficient stock market 
relating to frequency of ownership turnover,11 analyst reporting,12 and price-related issues 
associated with cause-and-effect,13 need to be adjusted to take into account the nuances of the 
bond market.  Our analysis of these factors lends support to a conclusion, contrary to that 
reached by the AIG court, that the AIG bonds indeed traded in open, developed and efficient 
markets and that certification of a class of bondholders pursuing claims for material misleading 
statements and omissions would have been warranted.14 
 To address these issues, this paper is organized as follows.  Part I provides an overview 
of the law as it has developed regarding certification of class actions and the elements of a claim 
of fraud on the market as relevant to the lead plaintiffs’ claims of violations of the securities 
                                                            
9 AIG, 265 F.R.D. at 175.   “An open market is one in which anyone, or at least a large number of persons, can buy 
or sell. A developed market is one which has a relatively high level of activity and frequency, and for which trading 
information (e.g., price and volume) is widely available.  It is principally a secondary market in outstanding 
securities. It usually, but not necessarily, has continuity and liquidity (the ability to absorb a reasonable amount of 
trading with relatively small price changes).  An efficient market is one which rapidly reflects new information in 
price. These terms are cumulative in the sense that a developed market will almost always be an open one. And an 
efficient market will almost invariably be a developed one.”  Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F.Supp. 1264, 1276 (D.N.J. 
1989) (quoting 4 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD, § 
8.6 (1988)). 
10 AIG, 265 F.R.D. at 172. 
11 Cammer, 711 F.Supp. at 1286. 
12 Id. at 1286. 
13 Id. at 1287. 
14 The authors are not making any assertions regarding liability and materiality of the AIG bondholders’ claims. 
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laws.  Part II introduces the required empirical analysis and benchmarks to evaluate a claim of 
fraud on the market.  Part III continues with a theoretical discussion of the distinctions missing in 
the AIG analysis between bonds and stocks relevant to determining whether the bond market 
should be afforded the fraud on the market presumption.  Part IV builds on this with a discussion 
of our alternate empirical analyses.  Concluding remarks follow. 
I.   Securities Class Actions and Fraud on the Market 
 The AIG litigation involved the request by Ohio Public Employees Retirement System, 
State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio and the Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund 
(collectively, “Lead Plaintiffs”) against AIG, Maurice “Hank” Greenberg – AIG’s former Chief 
Executive Officer and Chairman, the firm’s outside auditors and other corporations and 
individuals (collectively, “Defendants”) for class certification.15  Ultimately, the court granted 
class certification, after making a number of modifications to the definition of the class, with 
respect to the equity stockholders, but denied class certification of the AIG bondholders.16   
 The first question addressed with regard to the bondholders’ claims was whether they had 
standing.  Although the bondholders were found to be without standing to bring some of their 
claims (the Sections 1117 and 1518 claims under the Securities Act of 1933),19 the court found 
standing for their Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b)20 and Securities Exchange Commission 
                                                            
15 AIG, 265 F.R.D. at 160-161. 
16 Claims against the defendants Wachovia Securities, Merrill Lynch, Gen Re, Ferguson, Houldsworth, and Naples 
were also dismissed  AIG, 265 F.R.D. at 161, 189. 
17 Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. §77a (2006). 
18 Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006). 
19 AIG, 265 F.R.D. at 189. 
20 AIG, 265 F.R.D. 157 at 157-66.  Securities Exchange Act §10(b), 15 U.S.C. §78a (2006). 
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(SEC) Rule 10b-521 claims.  It was thus the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims for which the 
court considered whether class certification of the bondholders would be appropriate.22 
 Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure23 outlines the requirements for class 
certification.24  The salient missing element with respect to the proposed class of bondholders in 
the AIG litigation involved the requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) that “questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members.”25  According to the AIG court, the “predominance requirement is met ‘if the plaintiff 
can establish that the issues in the class action that are subject to generalized proof, and thus are 
applicable to the class as a whole . . . predominate over the issues that are subject only to 
individualized proof.”26   
 A significant part of the analysis in AIG for determining whether the predominance 
requirement was met involved whether common issues of  “reliance on the integrity of the price 
set by the market” 27existed.  In order to establish that common issues of reliance predominated, 
the court found it necessary for the Lead Plaintiffs “to meet the requirements of the fraud on the 
market presumption”28 as described by the U.S. Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.29  
According to Basic, “the fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open 
and developed securities market, the price of a company’s stock is determined by the available 
material information regarding the company and its business. . . . Misleading statements will 
                                                            
21 AIG, 265 F.R.D.at 157-66;   Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
22 AIG, 265 F.R.D.  at 167. 
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
24 AIG, 265 F.R.D. at 157-66. 
25 Id. at 172 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)). 
26 AIG, 265 F.R.D. at 172 (quoting Cordes & Co. Financial Svcs. Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 502 F.3d 91, 
108-09 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
27 Id. at 172, 173-74 (quoting Basic, v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988)).   
28 Id. at 174. 
29 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
6 
 
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the 
misstatements.”30   
The AIG court further cited the opinion of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in In re 
Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litigation,31 where the court explained Basic as follows:  “The 
Basic court thereby set forth a test of general applicability that where a defendant has (1) 
publicly made (2) a material misrepresentation (3) about stock traded on an impersonal, well-
developed (i.e. efficient) market, investors’ reliance on those misrepresentations may be 
presumed.”32 
Integral to the court’s analysis then was the determination of whether the securities held 
by the bondholders were traded in an efficient market.  In Cammer v. Bloom,33 the district court 
detailed a five-factor test for determining the efficiency of equity markets.  The AIG court 
identified the following factors, emanating from those identified by Cammer, as important for 
establishing that stocks are traded in an efficient market: 
(1) a large weekly trading volume; 
(2) a significant number of securities analysts following and reporting on a 
company’s stock;  
(3) the presence of market makers and arbitrageurs who are able to react swiftly 
to company news and drive the price;  
(4) the eligibility of the company to file an S-3 Registration Statement for its 
public offerings; and  
                                                            
30 Id., 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988) 
31 544 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2008). 
32 AIG, 265 F.R.D. at 174 (quoting Salomon, 544 F.3d. at 480-81).  
33 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).  
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(5) empirical facts showing a cause and effect relationship between unexpected 
corporate events or financial releases and an immediate response in the stock 
price.34    
Recognizing that the Second Circuit has not adopted a test to determine whether stocks or 
bonds have been traded in an efficient market, the AIG court noted that the Second Circuit courts 
often apply the factors listed by the Cammer court in cases involving common stock35 and that 
these factors may be used as an analytical tool in litigation involving bonds.36  The AIG court 
then analyzed the efficiency of the AIG bond market, using these factors as a framework while 
considering other evidence it found relevant to the efficiency of the bond market.37 
II.  Empirical Analysis and Benchmarks 
To certify an investor class in Section 10 and Rule 10b-5 securities litigation the federal 
courts have relied for almost twenty years on analysis of the factors listed by the court in 
Cammer as a framework for determining whether securities traded in open, developed and 
efficient markets, with various modifications. 38   The factors articulated by the court in Cammer 
as expanded and enhanced by courts throughout the years, are referred to herein, collectively, as 
the Cammer factors.  These factors can be separated into two general categories – operational 
factors and price-related factors. The operational factors include a determination of whether:  
1) there was high average weekly turnover of the securities; 39  
                                                            
34 AIG, 265 F.R.D. at 176  (quoting In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG Litig., 537 F. Supp.2d 556, 574 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286-87)). 
35 AIG, 265 F.R.D. at 175. 
36 Id. at 175-76 (citing Teamsters Local 445, 546 F. 3d 196, 204 n.11 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
37 Id. at 175-76. 
38 See, e.g., Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F. 2d 193 (6th Cir. 1990); Krogman v. Sterrit, 202 F.R.D. 467 
(N.D. Tex. 2001); AAL High Yield Bond Fund v. Ruttenberg, 229 F.R.D. 676, 684-85 (N.D. Ala. 2005), In re 
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 529 F.Supp. 2d 644 (S.D.Tex. 2006);  In re DVI Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 
F.R.D. 196 (E.D. Pa. 2008); In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 257 F.R.D. 260 (N.D. Ala. 2009), Polymedica, 453 
F. Supp. 2d at 274. 
39 Weekly trading volume has been called possibly “one of the most important” of the Cammer factors.  Polymedica, 
453 F. Supp. 2d at 266 (quoting Krogman, 202 F.R.D. at 474 (D.Tex. 2001)). 
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2) there was continuous coverage of the securities by investment professionals, along 
with the regular disclosures by the company; 40 
3) there were a relatively high number of market makers or dealers of the securities, 
along with arbitrageurs; 41  
4) the securities were eligible to file on SEC Form-S-3 and to incorporate by reference       
on SEC Form S-4;42     
5) there was a relatively large cumulative face value of the securities;43    
 6) there were a relatively large proportion of institutional holdings of the securities;44 
 7) there were opportunities for arbitrage, including short selling at reasonable borrowing 
rates or observing violations in put-call parity;45  
                                                            
40 See In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig. 430 F.3d 503, 514 (1st Cir. 2005)  (“[T]he greater the number of securities 
analysts following and reporting on a company’s stock, the greater the likelihood that information released by a 
company is being relied upon by investors.”).  
41 See Polymedica, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 267-68 (quoting Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286-87 (D.N.J. 
1989) (“The existence of market makers and arbitrageurs would ensure completion of the market mechanism; these 
individuals would react swiftly to company news and reported financial results by buying or selling stock and 
driving it to a changed price level.”). Furthermore, according to Polymedica, “A market-maker is ‘[o]ne who helps 
establish a market for securities by reporting bid-and-asked quotations’ (the price a buyer will pay for a security and 
the price a seller will sell a security. . . . A market-maker also “stand[s] ready to buy or sell at these publicly quoted 
prices.” Id. at 268 (citations omitted). 
42 See http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/secforms.htm (“Form S-3 and Form S-4 allow eligible firms to use the short 
form and incorporate additional information by reference.  Form S-3 is a securities-registration form for companies 
that meet guidelines set by the SEC and report under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, where the offering and 
issuer must meet the requirements for eligibility.  One of the requirements to be eligible is that the issuer must have 
met all disclosure requirements throughout the past twelve months.  Form S-4 is a securities registration form 
relating to an exchange or merger.  It contains details on share distribution, terms, and amounts.   .  An important 
point is that S-3 eligible public companies can incorporate by reference in their SEC Form S-4 filings.); see also  
SEC Securities Act Release No. 6331 (August 13, 1981), as cited in Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1284 (D..N.J. 1989)  (“This form [S-3 
or S-4] is predicated on the Commission’s belief that the market operates efficiently for these companies, i.e., that the disclosure in 
Exchange Act reports and other communications by the registrant, such as press releases, has already been disseminated and 
accounted for by the market place.”).  
43 In Krogman the court suggested, “Market capitalization, calculated as the number of shares multiplied by the 
prevailing share price, may be an indicator of market efficiency because there is a greater incentive for stock 
purchasers to invest in more highly capitalized corporations.” Krogman, 202 F.R.D. 467. 
44   For example, in In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., the court decided that the Enron bonds 
traded in efficient markets partially based on the “data on institutional holdings demonstrate[ing] that from 20 to 115 
institutions held Enron bonds throughout any quarter end throughout the Class Period (65 on average, a median of 
65). Total holdings for all reporting institutions at a quarter-end throughout the Class Period ranged from 2.7% of 
face value to 93% of face value per issue (45% on average, a median of 49%).  The total reported increases in 
holdings for quarters in the Class Period (Q4-98 through Q4-01) as a percentage of issue amount ranged from 12% 
to 137% per issue (77% on average, a median of 69%). Thus there was active trading in Enron Registered Bonds 
throughout the Class Period, there were a substantial number of institutional investors.” 529 F.Supp. 2d 644, 750 
(S.D. Tex. 2006). 
45 See In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F.Supp.2d 260 (D. Mass. 2006) (“This Court rejects the assertion that 
arbitrage is the only mechanism of information efficiency, but accepts that the significant role of arbitrageurs toward 
that end is widely acknowledged in academic commentary – including sources cited by the First Circuit in 
PolyMedica.”).        
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8) there was a reasonably small bid-ask spread;46 and 
9) there is a sufficiently large float (i.e., the amount of outstanding securities that are 
not held by insiders of the corporation).47 
Price-related factors include a determination of: 
1) whether there was a rapid price reaction to new information relevant to the valuation 
of these securities;48 and 
2) whether there were certain statistical properties of price or yield movements, such as 
the lack of autocorrelation.49   
The criteria outlined by various courts addressing whether a particular securities market 
is open, developed and efficient have generally been used to examine a corporation’s common 
stock and thus require adjustment when the securities market at issue is a corporate bond market.  
Unfortunately, in AIG, both the economic and legal analyses failed to account for the critical 
differences between the functioning and performance of common stock markets versus corporate 
bond markets.  Specifically, further evaluation of the rate of turnover of the AIG Debt 
Securities,50 coverage by investment professionals, 51 and the speed of the reaction to new 
information in the bond market about the company is needed to address whether the AIG Debt 
                                                            
46 See Krogman, 202 F.R.D. 467, (“A large bid-ask spread is indicative of an inefficient market, because it suggests 
that the stock is too expensive to trade.”). 
47 Insiders cannot freely trade in the stock of their firm based on their privileged, nonpublic information.  They are 
subject to both trading restrictions (blackout periods, and restrictions of Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 
10(b)(5), 16(b), and 16(c), as well as reporting requirements of Section 16(a)).  15 U.S.C. §78a et. seq. (2006). 
48See Polymedica, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 271(“In other words, for a market to be efficient, the response of a stock’s 
price to news must be made completely (i.e., have reached a new equilibrium) before an ‘ordinary investor’ can earn 
a trading profit based upon it.”). 
49 “Autocorrelation is usually found in time-series data. Economic time-series often displays a ‘memory’ in that 
variation is not independent from one period to the next.”  WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 358 (2d 
ed. 1993).  In other words, autocorrelation is the measurement of the relationship between the security return at time 
t and the return of the same security at some fixed time in the past. First-order autocorrelation would be found when 
there is a statistically significant relationship between the bond return today and the bond return yesterday.  Another 
way of looking at this concept is that if an observer can use the return from yesterday to predict with some level of 
certainty the return today there exists autocorrelation.  See Lehocky v. Tidel Techs., Inc., 220 F.R.D. 491, 505 n.15, 
506 n.18 (S.D. Tex. 2004) at 506 n.20 (noting that both parties’ experts agreed on the helpfulness of 
autocorrelation); Poylmedica, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 276-78. 
50 In re American Int’l Group, Inc. Sec. Litig, 265 F.R.D. 157, 176-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (describing the trading 
frequency of the AIG Debt Securities). 
51 Id. at 177. 
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Securities traded in an efficient market.52  Furthermore, close examination of these factors sheds 
light on the differences between the trading of stocks and bonds.  Unfortunately, the AIG court 
instead focused on the alleged lack of transparency of the bond market.53  To more fully address 
how the bond market differs from the stock market, Part III provides a brief primer on corporate 
bonds followed in Part IV with the bond market analysis missing in AIG.  
III.  Fraud on the Market:  Stock vs. Bonds and the Missing Theoretical Analysis 
 
A.  The Corporate Bond Market 
A corporate bond is a security issued in connection with a corporation’s borrowing 
activity.  The borrower (the corporation) receives a lump sum payment in return for a promise to 
make periodic payments to the lender in the future.  These periodic payments typically include 
semiannual payments of interest to lenders (called coupon payments), as well as a lump sum 
payment at maturity (called principal payment).54   
After the corporate bonds are issued, investors can, if they wish, buy and sell the bonds in 
the secondary market.  If the corporate bonds are not registered with the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC), trading can only take place based on applicable SEC rules.  Under SEC Rule 
144A, unregistered securities may only be bought and sold by Qualified Institutional Buyers.55  
If, however, the bonds are registered with the SEC, any investor may buy or sell bonds in the 
secondary market.   
                                                            
52 Id. at 179-79. 
53 Id. at 179. 
54 Corporate bonds frequently have covenants or terms whereby the bond may be put to the company by the investor 
or called by the company. They can be convertible and/or secured by assets.  
55  SEC Rule 144A(a) defines Qualified Institutional Buyer as institutions that manage at least $100 million in 
securities, including banks, savings and loans institutions, insurance companies, investment companies, employee 
benefit plans, or an entity owned entirely by qualified investors.  Also included are registered broker-dealers owning 




Even so, for registered corporate bonds, the market is primarily composed of institutional 
traders.  Furthermore, most transactions take place over-the-counter, where the potential bond 
trader cannot observe quotes on a centralized or electronic exchange.56  Instead, the institution or 
customer must call one or more dealers for quotes or alternatively, have access to the broadcast 
list of bonds that are trading from various dealers for quotes through electronic platforms such as 
Bloomberg, a vendor of quotes and financial information that is popular with institutions.57 
The price of bonds is calculated as the present value of the expected future cash flows 
they generate.  In turn, the present value calculation depends upon the magnitude and timing of 
promised bond payments and the likelihood of repayment, as well as the market interest rates for 
comparable securities.  The price of a fixed coupon bond is inversely related to its yield.  This 
means that as bond prices fall, the yield rises. 
Therefore both the price and yield58 of corporate bonds are determined by six 
components: 59   
(1) The expected rate of return on similar maturity, risk-less debt (i.e., government or 
Treasury bonds); 
(2) The various covenants, provisions and restrictions associated with the particular bond 
(e.g., call terms, convertibility features, seniority in the event of default, maturity date, 
etc.); 
                                                            
56 Corporate bonds also trade on the New York Stock Exchange, a centralized exchange where there are readily 
available price quotes.  Estimates suggest that only a small proportion of all corporate bond trades are made on the 
New York Stock Exchange.  See FRANK J. FABOZZI, THE HANDBOOK OF FIXED INCOME SECURITIES 40, 7th ed. 
(2005).   
57  See id. at 40.   
58 The value of a bond with a fixed coupon is expressed as a price relative to $100 par value.  This price relative to 
par value is inversely related to its yield.  This means that as the bond price falls, the yield rises. 
59 The first three components of the value of a corporate bond are discussed in detail in Robert C. Merton, On the 
Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates, 29 J. FIN. 449-70 (1974).  With respect to 
components (4) and (6), see, e.g., Edwin Elton, Martin Gruber, Deepak Agrawal & Christopher Mann, Factors 
Affecting the Valuation of Corporate Bonds, 28 J. BANKING & FIN., 2747-2767 (2004); Merton Miller, Debt and 
Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261-75 (1977); Merton Miller and Myron Scholes, Dividends and Taxes, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 333-64 
(1978); Harry DeAngelo & Ronald W. Masulis, Leverage and Dividend Irrelevancy under Corporate and Personal 
Taxation, 35 J. FIN. 453 (1980).  
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(3) The default risk or the probability that the company will be unable to satisfy some or 
all of the indenture requirements given current and expected future economic conditions; 
(4) The likely recovery rate of the bonds in case of bankruptcy or liquidation given 
current and expected future economic conditions;   
(5) The tax considerations of the bond payments; and 
(6) The likelihood of being able to sell the corporate bond in a liquid market. 
In an efficient market, changes in these factors will explain the variation in the prices and 
yields of corporate bonds.  Generally, however, daily changes in corporate bond prices and 
yields are most often a function of only three of these factors: changes in risk-free Treasury rates 
of interest, changes in risk-premiums for similar-risk corporate bonds, and changes in the 
company’s likelihood of default on its obligations.60  Most important, and key to any proper 
analysis of whether the a debt security trades in an efficient market is understanding that, all else 
constant, if firm-specific disclosures do not alter the company’s likelihood of default, bond 
pricing theory predicts there will be little change in the price or yield of the bond.61  In addition, 
bond pricing theory predicts that changes in risk-free interest rates or changes in risk-premiums, 
say from an economy-wide shock, might cause a price reaction for a corporate bond.  Thus, even 
without any new firm-specific information or change in the company’s likelihood of default on 
its obligations, bond pricing theory predicts there might be a price change due to changes in 
other factors.62 
Although U.S. Government obligations are typically viewed as free from default risk, the 
same is not true for corporate bonds.  Corporations can and do default on their promises to make 
                                                            
60 Typically, tax, recovery rate, and liquidity factors are stable day-to-day.  Another variable that can affect the 
valuation of the bonds, the age of the bond, is deterministic (i.e., known in advance).  Thus, while all of these factors 
affect bond prices, they will have only a small effect day-to-day.  See FABOZZI, supra note 56, chs. 5-7.   
61 See id. ch. 13.  
62 See id. Fama and French use regression analysis to attempt to adjust bond returns for these changes in risk-free 
rates and risk-premiums. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns, 
47 J. FIN. 427-65 (1992); Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and 
Bonds, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 3-56 (1993).  
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future payments or otherwise abide by the bond indentures and covenants.63  Bond default risk, 
also called credit risk, is measured by various rating agencies, such as Moody’s Investor 
Services, Standard and Poor’s Corporation, Duff and Phelps, and Fitch Investors Service.  Bonds 
are generally separated into two groups:  investment-grade bonds, with Standard and Poor’s 
ratings BBB- or higher, and speculative-grade bonds with ratings BB+ or lower.64   
Highly rated investment-grade bonds rarely default.65  In other words, firms issuing 
investment-grade bonds have adequate cash flows to cover current interest and principal payment 
obligations and sufficient assets to back up the long-term payment obligations.  The relative 
safety of the investment-grade bonds in effect separates the pricing of the investment-grade 
bonds (if they are not convertible or if the stock price is significantly below the conversion price 
for convertible bonds) from day-to-day stock price fluctuations of the issuing firm.  
Consequently, in efficient capital markets, the price of the investment-grade bonds is not very 
sensitive to day-to-day stock price fluctuations of the issuer, nor will it always react to corporate 
announcements.66  Hence, in efficient capital markets, most of the variation in the prices of 
investment-grade bonds comes from fluctuations in economy-wide interest rates, as opposed to 
firm-specific information.67   
                                                            
63  See FABOZZI, supra note 56, chs. 32-33.   
64 Throughout the Class Period, the bond ratings for the AIG debt provided by Moody’s Investor Services and 
Standard and Poor’s Corporation were Aaa and AAA, respectively. 
65 For A or higher rated investment-grade bonds, default is rare as demonstrated by a cumulative ten-year default 
rate of less than one percent.  Hence, fewer than one out of 1,000 of the A or higher rated investment-grade bonds 
have defaulted in a given year.  Nevertheless, some highly rated bonds have defaulted.  In May 2001, WorldCom 
sold $11.8 billion of highly rated bonds.  A year later, the firm filed for bankruptcy, and the bonds lost more than 80 
percent of the investment value.  For the lowest level of investment-grade bonds, the BBB-rated bonds, the 
cumulative default rate after ten years is around ten percent, or about one percent per year.  Overall, investment-
grade bonds are characterized by high interest coverage and low debt-to-capital ratios.  See, e.g., STEPHEN A. ROSS, 
RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & JEFFREY JAFFE, CORPORATE FINANCE ch. 20, 8th ed. (2008).     
66 See FABOZZI, supra note 56, ch. 32.   
67 An investment-grade bond is assigned a rating in the top four categories by commercial credit rating companies. 
S&P classifies investment-grade bonds as BBB or higher, and Moody's classifies investment-grade bonds as Baa or 
higher. See STEPHEN A. ROSS, RANDOLPH W. WESTERFIELD & JEFFREY JAFFE, supra note 65, ch. 20.     
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Defaults on non-investment-grade, high-yield or speculative-grade bonds (also called 
junk bonds) are much more common.  About half of all bonds that are rated CCC by Standard 
and Poor’s Corporation have defaulted within ten years.68  Although high-yield bonds, like 
investment-grade bonds, are also sensitive to changes in interest rates and credit market 
conditions, stock price behavior of the issuing firm, and other firm-specific announcements have 
a much greater impact on the value of high-yield bonds.69  Therefore, in efficient markets, there 
is substantially more sensitivity between the prices of the issuer’s stock and its high-yield bond; 
that bond price will thus be more sensitive to corporate announcements.   
A hypothetical example will demonstrate how economic factors might differentially 
affect the prices of investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds.  Assume an investment-
grade bond has a coupon of 10 percent, it is priced in the market at its par value of $100,  and it 
will be paid off at $100 in one year.  All else constant, if the stock price of the issuer doubles, 
there will be little if any impact on the price of the investment-grade bond, because the 
maximum payoff at maturity is $100.  If interest rates, however, double to 20 percent, the value 
of the bond with its fixed coupon is reduced and the bond price will fall.  Alternatively, a 
speculative-grade bond with a coupon of 10 percent, par value of $100 and a market price of $50 
will react to both of these events.  A doubling of interest rates to 20 percent will, like its effect on 
the investment-grade bond, cause downward pressure on the price for the speculative-grade 
bond.  However, if the stock price doubles, sending a signal of an improved likelihood that the 
bond will be redeemed at $100, then in an efficient market, bond-pricing theory predicts there 
will be upward pressure on the speculative-grade bond price.   
                                                            
68 See id. 
69 See FABOZZI, supra note 56, ch. 32.   
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This example also demonstrates an important observation about corporate bonds.  
Investment-grade bond prices are expected to be sensitive to only bond pricing factors, such as 
risk-free interest rates, the default premium and the term spread.70  Speculative-grade bond prices 
are expected to be sensitive not only to these same bond pricing factors, but also to stock market 
pricing factors, such as stock returns for the underlying firm.71     
A full understanding of the various covenants, provisions and restrictions associated with 
a particular bond (e.g., call terms, convertibility features, seniority in the event of default, 
maturity date, redemption terms, etc.) is required to evaluate bond price reactions to new 
information.  For example, assume there is a bond covenant that that triggers an immediate 
repayment of a corporation’s debt, should there be a delay in its SEC filings.  In an efficient 
market a negative announcement by a company that it is delaying its SEC filing might, all else 
constant, be expected to lead to a rise in the bond price with the anticipation that the company 
will be forced to redeem its debt, while the stock price falls.72  Without accounting for this 
important factor – i.e., the covenant – in the determination of the bond’s price movements, a 
meaningful analysis of market efficiency cannot be carried out. 
The AIG Debt Securities were convertible into AIG’s common stock.  This means that 
AIG bondholders had the right to exchange their bonds for a preset number of shares of AIG 
stock.  Covenants, such as conversion rights, can cause the bond prices to react in different ways 
than stock prices when there are firm-specific disclosures.  Furthermore, covenants, such as 
conversion rights, can cause the bond prices to react in different ways to firm-specific 
disclosures depending on the level of stock prices.  The magnitude of the price reaction 
                                                            
70 See id. ch. 32.  
71 This dichotomy of variables that explain variations in bond prices is explained in Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. 
French, Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1993). 
72 See FABOZZI, supra note 56, ch. 32.   
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associated with a firm-specific disclosure will differ depending on whether the bond’s 
conversion option is said to be “in-the-money” or “out-of-the money.”  The conversion option is 
in-the-money if the price of the stock is above the conversion price for the bonds.  The 
conversion option is out-of-the-money if the price of the stock is below the conversion price for 
the bonds.  For bonds where the conversion option is in-the-money, in an efficient market, bond 
pricing theory predicts there will be a close, almost one-for-one relationship between bond and 
stock price movements.73  For bonds with conversion options that are out-of-the-money, and 
especially for investment grade debt, in an efficient market, bond pricing theory predicts that 
firm-specific information will have little if any impact on the price of the bond and there will be 
little relationship between stock and bond price movements.74   
A hypothetical example will demonstrate how economic factors might differentially 
affect the prices of bonds where the conversion option is in-the-money versus out-of-the-money.  
Assume an investment-grade bond has a par value of $100 and a market price of $100, and is 
convertible into one share of common stock.  This means that if the price of the common stock is 
above $100, the bond’s conversion option is in-the-money.  Thus, if the stock is trading at $120 
bond pricing theory predicts that the bond will trade at or around $120, because the bondholders 
can convert each of their bonds into one share of stock valued at $120.  In this case should there 
be a disclosure of firm-specific information that leads to a reduction in the stock price to $119, in 
an efficient market bond pricing theory would predict that the bond price would also fall to about 
$119.  Alternatively, when the stock is trading at $50 per share, this hypothetical bond’s 
conversion option is out-of-the-money.  Thus, the same disclosure that causes a stock price 
reduction from $50 to $49 per share would not necessarily be expected to have any impact on the 
                                                            
73 See id., chs. 59-60.   
74 See id.   
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bond price in an efficient market.  In fact, if the disclosure does not lead to a change in the 
likelihood of the company defaulting on its debt obligations, then in an efficient market bond 
pricing theory would predict that there should be no change in the price of the bond.   
In general, in an efficient market, bond pricing theory predicts that, all else constant, the 
relationship between stock and bond price movements, and firm-specific disclosures, will be 
stronger as the level of the stock price moves toward the conversion price – i.e., as the 
conversion option gets closer to being in-the-money.  In other words, all else constant, bond 
pricing theory predicts that in an efficient market there will be a non-linear relationship between 
bond and stock returns.75   
Other Cammer factors such as turnover also require some adjustments when translating 
from the stock market to the bond market.  Corporate bonds will likely trade less frequently than 
stocks because the outside influences and internal financial factors have less effect on pricing.76  
Unlike common stocks, corporate bonds have predictable cash flows, predictable terminal 
values, fixed upside opportunities – namely redemption at par value or $100 in our example – 
and priority on the corporation’s assets.  As such, many corporate bonds are close substitutes for 
each other.  This is especially true for AAA-rated bonds such as the AIG Debt Securities.  On the 
other hand, corporate equity does not have predictable cash flows, predictable terminal values, 
fixed upside opportunities, nor priority on the corporate assets.77  These critical differences in the 
                                                            
75 A linear relationship suggests that as the stock price goes up by a certain percentage the bond price will, on 
average, go up by that percentage times some fixed constant.  For example, if the fixed constant coefficient is 0.50, 
then a linear relationship means that when the stock price goes up by 10%, one would expect the bond price to go up 
by 5%.  As established above, the relationship between bond and stock price movements will not have a fixed linear 
relationship. 
76 See S. Edith Hotchkiss & Gergana Jostova, Determinants of Corporate Bond Trading: A Comprehensive Analysis, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1001459. 
77 See In re HealthSouth, Inc. Sec. Litig., (after evaluating the differences between stocks and bonds, the court was 
“led to the conclusion that certainly some the differences [with stocks] must be considered when evaluating the 
efficiency of a bond market.”) 261 F.R.D. 616, 630 (N.D. Ala. 2009). 
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characteristics of stocks and bonds lead to the differential influence of firm-specific and external 
economic factors.  Thus, many fixed income investors tend to buy and hold bonds until maturity.  
Therefore, research has shown that few, if any corporate bonds, (i.e., fewer than one percent) 
will trade each business day in a given calendar year.78  A large proportion of corporate bonds 
(greater than 40%) do not trade even once a year.79   Less frequent trading in and of itself is not 
significant for a security to trade in an efficient market.  
IV. Fraud on the Market:  AIG and the Missing Empirical Analysis 
 
A.   Background Related to AIG Bonds 
The Consolidated Third Amended Class Action Complaint brought in AIG describes five 
AIG bond offerings that took place between October 28, 1999 and April 1, 2005 (the “Class 
Period”).80  Four counts relating to the bond offerings were dismissed.  The remaining count 
relating to bonds involved $210 million worth of 0.5% Cash Exchangeable Equity-Linked Senior 
Notes, due May 15, 2007 and issued on or about May 11, 2000 (0.5% Notes),81 and $1.5 billion 
of Zero-Coupon Convertible Senior Debentures, due November 9, 2031 and issued on or about 
                                                            
78 Sriketan Mahanti, Amrut Nashikkar, Marti Subrahmanyam, George Chacko & Gaurav Mallik, Latent Liquidity: A 
New Measure of Liquidity, with an Application to Corporate Bonds, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 272, 278, 282 (2008). 
79 Id. at 282. (“For the median traded bond, the average time between trades varied between 12 days and 18 days 
within the sample period. (There are roughly twenty-two trading days in a calendar month._  For the median stock, 
in comparison, this value is more on the order of minutes.  For the most liquid stocks, this statistic is in seconds.”)  
The authors also found that, “Bonds in the financial services industry (the banks and the other financial categories) 
traded the most during the sample period. This is not surprising because the financial services industry is the biggest 
issuer of corporate debt.”  Id. at 280. 
80 Consolidated Third Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, In re American Int’l Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 
F.R.D. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
81 American International Group, Inc., Prospectus Supplement (Form 424B5) (Mar. 4, 2001); Consolidated Third 
Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 80, at 56. 
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November 9, 2001 (Zero-Coupon Debentures).82  The Zero-Coupon Debentures and the 0.5% 
Notes (collectively, the “AIG Debt Securities”) are the primary focus of our analysis.  
Throughout the Class Period the AIG Debt Securities were rated AAA by S&P 
Corporation until March 30, 2005 when the rating was dropped to AA+.  These securities were 
also simultaneously rated Aaa by Moody’s until March 31, 2005 when the rating was dropped to 
Aa1.  Therefore, the AIG Debt Securities were investment grade throughout the Class Period. 
This is consistent with the trading prices of the AIG Debt Securities.  As shown in Exhibit 1 
below, the 0.5% Notes traded close to par value (or $100), while the Zero-Coupon Debentures 
price slowly increased over the relevant time period. This slow incline would be expected from a 
zero-coupon security where the return does not come from a coupon payment, but from a capital 
gain.  
In addition, Exhibits 1 and 2 also show that AIG’s stock price varied substantially such 
that the conversion options for the bonds would have also varied considerably.  We discuss this 
further below in Section C.  
  
                                                            
82 AIG, 265 F.R.D. at 175  (“because Lead Plaintiffs have standing for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 bond claim, the 
Court must examine whether the members of the class can rely on the fraud-on-the-market presumption in bringing 











































































































































































American International Group (AIG)
Split-Adjusted Stock Price vs. Weighted-Average Price of 0.5% Note1
May 11, 2000 - April 1, 2005
Weighted-Average Price of Note Split-Adjusted Stock Price
Note: 1 CUSIP: 026874AN7
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American International Group (AIG)
Split-Adjusted Stock Price vs. 
Weighted-Average Price of Zero Coupon Debenture1
November 9, 2001 - April 1, 2005
Weighted-Average Price of Note Split-Adjusted Stock Price
Note: 1CUSIP: 026874AP2
Source: Bloomberg and TRACE.  Bloomberg data is used for the Zero Coupon Debenture from 11/9/01- 6/28/02. TRACE data for the Debenture is used for 7/1/02 - 4/29/05. 
Zero Coupon Debenture Split-Adjusted Stock Price
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B.  Applying the Cammer Factors to the Bond Market  
This section examines the important components of the operational and price-related 
Cammer factors  and highlights the need for additional empirical analyses or background on 
bond pricing theory when differentiating between the stock and bond markets.  The operational 
Cammer factors focus on the trading activity in the market and are primarily examined to answer 
the question of whether a security trades in an open and developed market.83  An open capital 
market is one in which anyone can buy and sell securities.84  A developed capital market is one 
that has a high level of trading activity, and for which trading information is readily available.85  
A developed capital market can be characterized as a liquid market that can absorb a reasonable 
amount of trading volume at relatively low trading costs.86  The price-related Cammer factors are 
primarily used to examine whether the market price for a security rapidly reflects new 
information as would be expected in an open, developed and efficient market. 87   
The first subsection below focuses on the operational Cammer factors of turnover or 
market activity followed by a discussion of transaction size and frequency.  In addition, because 
it is often confused with turnover, subsection 3 also examines what economists call 
                                                            
83 Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F.Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989). 
84 See BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 9, § 8.6. 
85 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 9, § 8.6 (“A developed market is one which has a relatively high level of 
activity and frequency, and for which trading information (e.g., price and volume) is widely available. It is 
principally a secondary market in outstanding securities. It usually, but not necessarily, has continuity and liquidity 
(the ability to absorb a reasonable amount of trading with relatively small price changes).”  
86  According to Bromberg and Lowenfels : “An efficient market is one which rapidly reflects new information in 
price. These terms are cumulative in the sense that a developed market will almost always be an open one. And an 
efficient market will almost invariably be a developed one.”  BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 9, § 8.6. 
87 Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1291 (“One of the most convincing ways to demonstrate [market] efficiency would be to 
illustrate, over time, a cause and effect relationship between company disclosures and resulting movements in stock 
price.”);  see also Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 477 (D. Tex. 2001) (“In an efficient market, a stock’s price 
remains relatively stable in the absence of news, and changes very rapidly as the market receives new and 
unexpected information.”);  In re SCOR Holding (Switz.) AG Litig., 537 F. Supp. 2d 556, 574 (S.D. N. Y. 2008) 
(citing Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286-87); In re Xcelera.com Secs. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 511 (1st Cir. 2005). 
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“transparency.”88  The AIG court89 and some economists90 appear to rely on rhetorical arguments 
related to this ambiguous and undefined concept.  Yet, this concept appears to be a straw man 
that, when used, virtually eliminates the possibility of certifying any bondholder class for the 
$7.4 trillion corporate bond market.    The Part concludes with subsection 4 on analyst coverage 
and corporate bonds. 
  1.  Turnover and Corporate Bonds 
In his report and testimony, Lead Plaintiffs’ expert witness opined, with regard to 
the AIG Debt Securities that “[b]oth securities were actively traded.”91  He concluded, 
“Since bonds whose transactions are reported on TRACE tend to be liquid, the relatively 
high volume of trading is evidence that the markets for the Debt Securities were efficient 
during the Class Period.”92  The AIG court, however disagreed and instead concluded 
that, Lead Plaintiffs did not show “evidence of a free market based on volume of 
trading.” 93  The court noted that the expert did not state his basis for opining that the 
AIG bonds have a large trading volume.94   
                                                            
88 See Amy K. Edwards., Lawrence E. Harris & Michael S. Pipowar, Corporate Bond Market Transaction Costs and 
Transparency, 62 J. FIN. 1421 (2007). 
89 In re American International Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
90 See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, TRADING TRANSPARENCY IN THE UK SECONDARY BOND MARKETS (2005), 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp05_05.pdf. (“we also recognize that transparency should be 
viewed as a facilitator of market efficiency and investor protection, not an end in itself.  ‘Maximum’ transparency is 
not necessarily optimal.”).   
91 Declaration of John D. Finnerty, Ph. D. in Support of Lead Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification at ¶ 62, In re 
American Int’l Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 04 Civ. 8141 (DAB)). 
92 Id.  at ¶ 63. 
93 AIG, 265 F.R.D. at 177. 
94 Id. (Although Dr. Finnerty has shown that the 0.5% and Zero-Coupon bonds trade at a higher average volume and 
in larger average dollar amounts than the majority of TRACE-reported bonds, this cannot support his claim that the 
AIG bonds trade in an efficient market without some further showing that these other bonds trade in an efficient 
market themselves.  This Dr. Finnerty has not done.  Nor has Dr. Finnerty compared the volume and value of trading 
in the AIG bonds to other securities for which studies or courts have found them to trade in efficient markets.) 
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Unfortunately, regarding arguably one of the most critical factors demonstrating whether 
a market is open and developed – turnover to measure market activity – no measure of turnover 
was presented to the court.95  The Cammer court is clear that this is an important benchmark for 
determining market efficiency - “average weekly trading of two percent or more of the 
outstanding shares would justify a strong presumption that the market for the security is an 
efficient one; one percent would justify a substantial presumption.”96  
A variety of turnover measures can be computed for each of the AIG Debt Securities.  
For example, utilizing information from the Defendants’ expert report:  “AIG estimates the daily 
trading volume of the Zero-Coupon Debentures between November 7, 2001 and November 9, 
2006 was $12,156,000. AIG estimates the daily trading volume of the 0.5% Notes between May 
8, 2000 and May 15, 2007 was approximately $11,000,334.”97  Based on these two estimates of 
trading volume of the AIG Debt Securities, the average weekly turnover for the Zero-Coupon 
Debentures and the 0.5% Notes can be calculated at approximately 4.05% and 26.19% per five-
day week, respectively.  If one conservatively assumes that these AIG estimates count both sides 
of each transaction – i.e., both seller and buyer activity – and thus represent double counting of 
transaction volume,98 the estimates of turnover are still 2.0% and 13.1%, respectively.  
Moreover, these calculations represent the minimum levels because the estimates are based on 
market values of the bonds that traded rather than par values of $100 per bond.  As shown in 
Exhibits 1 and 2, because the market values of the AIG Debt Securities were lower than par 
                                                            
95 See Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. at 474 (D.Tex. 2001) (citation omitted) (Weekly trading volume has been 
called possibly “one of the most important” of the Cammer factors.). . 
96 Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F.Supp. 1264, 1286 (D.N.J. 1989). 
97 Declaration of John D. Finnerty, Ph. D. in Support of Lead Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification at ¶ 62, In re 
American Int’l Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 04 Civ. 8141 (DAB)). 
98 Often both parties to a trade will report their activity so this number might be double-counting turnover.  
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values these turnover calculations are understated.99  Therefore, simple calculations demonstrate 
that turnover of the AIG Debt Securities was well in excess of the levels specified in Cammer.   
As further stated by the AIG court, it would have been helpful had Lead Plaintiffs  “compared the 
[average weekly turnover,] volume and value of trading in the AIG bonds to other securities for 
which studies or courts have found there exists an efficient market.”100 But, because no 
calculation of turnover was presented, the court had no basis from which to compare the trading 
of the AIG Debt Securities to the debt securities of other companies, such Enron,101 Just-For-
Feet,102 HealthSouth Corporation103 or DVI.104  In litigation concerning bonds issued by each of 
these companies, the courts found sufficient evidence that all the bonds traded in efficient 
markets.105  For example, a comparison of the turnover rates of the AIG Debt Securities with the 
bonds issued by these companies shows that the turnover of the AIG Debt Securities exceed 
most of the Enron Notes,106 and the two DVI Notes.107  Average weekly turnover of the 0.5% 
                                                            
99 Each of the AIG Debt Securities had a face value of $1,000, (though par price is often stated in terms of $100 
value).  Exhibits 1 and 2 show the market value per security would be less as neither traded at or above par value.  
We also calculated turnover using information in the Plaintiffs’ expert report (Exhibit P) which shows the Average 
Value of Daily Trading Volume for Morgan Stanley alone was $1,841,182 and $38,722,246 for the 0.5% Notes and 
the Zero-Coupon Debentures, respectively.  Along with the total number of trades for Morgan Stanley, the report 
contains enough information to calculate Morgan Stanley’s total volumes over the period of $2.3 billion and $33.2 
billion, respectively.  Finally, we also used the number of weeks the AIG Debt Securities traded over the Class 
Period to calculate yet another measure of average weekly turnover for the 0.5% Notes and the Zero-Coupon 
Debentures, of 4.2% and 12.5%, respectively.  Additional data based on the transaction volume reported in TRACE 
is also presented in the report.  Calculations using these alternative data sources also show that turnover of the AIG 
Debt Securities was well in excess of the levels specified in Cammer.  Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286; Declaration 
of John D. Finnerty, Ph. D. in Support of Lead Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification at Exhibit P, AIG, 265 
F.R.D. 157 (No. 04 Civ. 8141 (DAB)). 
100 In re American Int’l Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
101 In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644 (S.D. Tex 2006). 
102  AAL High Yield Bond Fund v. Ruttenberg, 229 F.R.D. 676, 685 (N.D. Ala. 2005). 
103 In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 634 (N.D. Ala. 2009). 
104 In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196 (E.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d, Nos. 08-8033, 08-8045, 2011 WL 1125926 (3d 
Cir. March 29, 2011). 
105 In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Lit., H-01-3624, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41240 *91 (S.D.Tex. Dec. 
22, 2005); DVI, 249 F.R.D. 196;  HealthSouth, 261 F.R.D. at 634. 
106Declaration of Suresh M. Sundaresan in Support of Deutsche Bank Entities’ Opposition to Lead Plaintiffs’ 
Amended Motion for Class Certification (#1445), In re Enron Corp., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 
644 (S.D. Tex. 2006), dated Feb. 13, 2006.  
107 DVI, 249 F.R.D. at 214. 
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Notes exceeded not only the turnover levels of DVI and Enron, but also average weekly turnover 
of the Just-For-Feet Bonds.108  Had these measures of turnover been presented to the court, it is 
conceivable that the AIG court may have reached a different conclusion.109 
2.   Transactions Size and Frequency 
Section III.A, above, discusses the characteristics of corporate bonds.  These features and 
the forces of supply and demand in the corporate bond market make clear why corporate bonds 
will trade far less frequently than every day.110  In fact, nothing in the economics literature nor in 
the case law suggests that in an efficient market a security must trade every day.  The critical 
differences in the characteristics of stocks and bonds discussed above explain why there might be 
differences in the average transaction size and frequency of trades.  Therefore, this is an area 
where it is important for courts to consider the differences in stock and bond market. to correctly 
assess whether a security trades in an efficient market.111  It is critically important  to adjust for 
the trading of bonds primarily by institutions, while stock trading has a much higher level of 
                                                            
108 AAL High Yield Bond Fund v. Ruttenberg, 229 F.R.D. 676, 684-85 (N.D. Ala. 2005).  See also Supplemental 
Declaration of Edith S. Hotchkiss, AAL High Yield Bond Fund v. Ruttenberg, 229 F.R.D. 676, 684-85 (N.D. Ala. 
2005)  dated May 24, 2005, p.5 ( “average weekly trading volume for the JFF Bonds (excluding the first week of 
trading) was 7.8%....”).  
The Dynex court minimized the importance of a precisely calculated turnover measure and suggested an “active” 
market for bonds was sufficient for a finding in favor of efficiency.  In re Dynex Capital, Inc. Sec. Litig 05 Civ. 
1897 (HB) (S.D.N.Y. 2011) at 5 (“This factor is not dispositive. First, even if a presumption based on 1% trading 
volume is not triggered, Dr. Ferri has shown that trading in the Bonds was active. Moreover, the Cammer 
presumption applied to stock trades, whereas the type of bonds at issue in this ease trade ‘relatively infrequently’ in 
general…A turnover rate below the 1% threshold established in Cammer for the stock market does not, without 
more, defeat a finding of an efficient bond market.”).   
110 See Sriketan Mahanti, Amrut Nashikkar, Marti Subrahmanyam, George Chacko & Gaurav Mallik, Latent 
Liquidity: A New Measure of Liquidity, with an Application to Corporate Bonds, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 272 (2008).  Also, 
according to the TRACE Fact Book for 2005, there were approximately 22,500 active publicly traded corporate 
bonds.  Thus, this sample is very representative of the universe of corporate bonds.  FINANCIAL INDUSTRY 
REGULATORY AUTHORITY, 2005 TRACE FACT BOOK (2005), available at 
http://www.finra.org/Industry/ContentLicensing/TRACE/P085342. 




retail or individual participation.  This is consistent with how the courts in HealthSouth,112 
DVI113 and Dynex Capital114 examined the issue.   
Moreover, even when a bond does not trade or trades infrequently, it does not mean the 
market is shut down, the flow of information is restricted or that firm-specific and external 
economic information is not being disseminated throughout the market.  Interested investors can 
simply contact bond dealers and learn about dealers’ buying and selling (bid and ask) prices and 
quantities.  That there may be no trade on a given day does not mean that interested investors are 
not communicating or do not or cannot generate transparency.  The concept of transparency is 
discussed further below.  Moreover, infrequent trading does not necessarily lead to a conclusion 
that “information (e.g., price and volume) is [not] widely available.”115  
Lead Plaintiffs’ expert concluded that both the AIG 0.5% and Zero-Coupon bonds were 
actively traded during the period when the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine 
("TRACE"),116 was in place.  He observed that, “Trades of the 0.5% Notes were reported [o]n 
                                                            
112 In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 639 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (“[D]enying application of fraud on 
the market to the bond market because it does not operate in the same way as a national exchange or trade in the 
same volume, frequency, or manner as equity on those exchanges [would be like] throwing out oranges because they 
are not apples. The Court finds that the issue is not whether the market for equity is more efficient than the market 
for debt securities, but whether the market for debt securities is adequately informationally efficient (whether the 
price reflect[s] all publicly available information) to trigger the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance.”).    
113 DVI, 249 F.R.D. at 214 (“[A] comparison between equity and bond markets is a comparison between the 
proverbial apple and orange…. [and] corporate bond investors cannot be categorically denied an opportunity to 
utilize the fraud on the market theory simply because of a structural difference in the way that debt securities are 
marketed and traded vis-a-vis equity securities.”).  
114 In re Dynex Capital, Inc. Sec. Litig., 05 Civ. 1897 (HB), 2011 WL 781215, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2011) (“Dr. 
Ferri [the plaintiff’s expert] has shown that trading in the Bonds was active.  Moreover, the Cammer presumption 
applied to stock trades, whereas the type of bonds at issue in this ease trade ‘relatively infrequently’ in general . . . A 
turnover rate below the 1% threshold established in Cammer for the stock market does not, without more, defeat a 
finding of an efficient bond market.”).   
115 Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F.Supp. 1264, 1287 (D.N.J. 1989). 
116 “The Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine is the FINRA [Financial Institution Regulatory Authority] 
developed vehicle that [as of July 2, 2002] facilitates the mandatory reporting of over the counter secondary market 
transactions in eligible fixed income securities. All broker/dealers who are FINRA member firms have an obligation 
to report transactions in corporate bonds to TRACE under an SEC approved set of rules.”  Trade Reporting and 
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TRACE beginning March 3, 2003” while “[t]rades of the Zero-Coupon Debentures were 
reported beginning July 1, 2002.”117  He also observed that the 0.5% bonds averaged 239 trades 
per year and .95 trades per trading day, while the Zero-Coupon bonds averaged 1,506 trades per 
year and 5.98 trades per trading day.118  
AIG's expert countered this testimony, claiming that the trading of the bonds did not 
support a conclusion of market efficiency, by noting that “the 0.5% Notes and the Zero-Coupon 
Debentures did not trade at all on approximately 283 days and 62 days [during the Class Period] 
respectively,”119  and that this was true even though TRACE was active during the period in 
question.  The court agreed.  Yet, as discussed above, this rejection of market efficiency because 
the AIG Debt Securities failed to trade each day of the Class Period does not take into account 
the realities of the bond market.  No benchmarks or accepted methodologies are described to 
determine how many days the securities need to trade before the market is found to be efficient.  
Thus if the number of trading days for the AIG Debt Securities when there was no activity was 
282 or 141 or 70 or one, instead of 283, would that lead to a fact-based conclusion that the bond 
is more likely to trade in a more efficient market?  Or alternatively, if the number of trading days 
in the Class Period when there was no activity was 300, 350 or more, would that lead to a fact-
based conclusion it is less likely to trade in a more efficient market?  The answer to both 
questions must be no.  Otherwise, all bonds trading in the $7.4 trillion corporate debt market 
must trade in inefficient markets because few if any corporate bonds trade every day, year after 
year.   
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Compliance Engine, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/MarketTransparency/TRACE/ (last visited Apr. 8, 
2011). 
117 Declaration of John D. Finnerty, Ph. D. in Support of Lead Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification at ¶ 60, In re 
American Int’l Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 04 Civ 8141 (DAB)). 
118 Id. at ¶¶ 62-63, Exhibit G. 
119 AIG, 265 F.R.D. at 177; Declaration of Charles C. Cox at ¶ 62, In re American Int’l Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 
F.R.D. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 04 Civ 8141 (DAB)). 
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The AIG court’s finding insufficient support for bond market efficiency on the basis of 
the number of trading days is also contrary to the economic theory of why parties trade in 
securities markets.  Parties seek to trade to gain from informational advantages when they 
possess new information or have differences of opinions.  Investors will enter into transactions 
only when there are differences of opinion based on changes in information.  Thus, the finding in 
AIG could lead to the nonsensical conclusion that for a security to trade in an efficient market, it 
must trade each day even if there is no new information or changed investor circumstances.  As 
discussed above, the differences between stocks and bonds suggest there will be on average 
fewer corporate bond transactions.120  In fact, if information or opinions do not change each day, 
yet there is high frequency of trading, this might be a sign that that security actually trades in an 
inefficient market that possibly resembles a casino.  
Unfortunately, the empirical analysis the AIG court relied on failed to compare measures 
of transaction size and frequency of trading to those measures observed for other debt securities 
where other courts found that the securities to trade in efficient markets.121  The frequency of 
trading of the AIG Debt Securities is far greater when compared to the activity of the Just-for-
                                                            
120 Stock market efficiency does not require that there be a trade all the time, only that when there is a trade that the 
price at which the trade takes place properly reflect all publicly available evidence.   Some markets are simply less 
liquid than others, though this does not make them less efficient.  Investors trade for different reasons, allocating 
their endowments, achieving better diversification, dealing with shocks to liquidity, or because of the differences in 
their beliefs or information.  It is possible that some new information arrival results in such a stock price reaction 
where all potential buyers and sellers believe that there is no advantage to be gained by trading at the new stock 
price.  In this case, there can be zero trade associated with news arrival.  Such an occurrence is not inconsistent with 
market efficiency.  Schwert finds that the market for New York Stock Exchange seats is highly efficient and it 
reflected rents available from the seat, even though the trading is highly illiquid.  In fact, New York Stock Exchange 
seats traded less than once a year.  See G. William Schwert, Stock Exchange Seats as Capital Assets, 4 J. FIN. 
ECON.51 (1977). 
121 See, e.g., In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196 (E.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d, Nos. 08-8033, 08-8045, 2011 WL 
1125926 (3d Cir. March 29, 2011); In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 756 
(S.D. Tex 2006); AAL High Yield Bond Fund v. Ruttenberg, 229 F.R.D. 676, 684-85 (N.D. Ala. 2005).  
29 
 
Feet unregistered bonds;122 the hundreds of Enron Notes123 and the DVI Notes,124 all of which 
were found to have traded in efficient markets.  The Zero-Coupon Debentures traded on 90% of 
the trading days, while the 0.5% Notes traded on 36% of the trading days or about 2 days per 
week.  For comparison, the Just-for-Feet unregistered bonds traded approximately 54% of the 
trading days or 2.7 days per week, thus less frequently than the Zero-Coupon Debenture.125  
Also, trading far less frequently than the Zero-Coupon Debenture were the DVI Notes, which 
were traded on 52% of trading days within the Class Period.126  Finally, when compared to the 
frequency of trading of the Enron Notes, which also were found to be traded in an efficient 
market, it is clear that the AIG Debt Securities traded in a far more active market than the Enron 
Notes as the percentage of days on which the trades occurred for the AIG Debt Securities (90% 
and 36% for the Zero-Coupon Debenture and 0.5% Note, respectively) met or exceeded the 
percentages for all the Enron bonds.127   
Finally, the average transaction size for the AIG 0.5% Notes and the Zero-Coupon 
Debentures were $881,146 and $16,190,369, respectively.128  That the market was able to absorb 
trades of this magnitude on a regular basis without massive price movements, should by itself 
                                                            
122  See AAL, 229 F.R.D. at 684-85  (regarding the e Just for Feet bonds, the court concluded, “[t]he market for these 
bonds was informationally efficient notwithstanding that on some days the trading volume was low and on others, 
there was no trading at all.”).  This was partially based on the following facts, “The trading volume of the JFF high 
yield bonds was not thin. They traded on at least 75 of the 140 days between the initial offering and the Chapter 11 
bankruptcy filing on November 3, 1999. Excluding the first week of trading, the average daily trading amount of 
JFF bonds was $3,245,107. The total face amount purchased by investors over the 140 days was $138,205,000, and 
the total sales were $316,110,000.”   Id. (citations omitted). 
123 Enron, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 756.  
124 DVI, 249 F.R.D. 196, 214-215.   
125 HealthSouth, 216 F.R.D. 616 (No. CV-03-BE-1500_S). 
126 DVI, 249 F.R.D. 196, 214-215. 
127 The Enron court noted, “The underwriter data reflect over 15,800 trades for Enron Registered Bonds throughout 
the Class Period. The number of transactions per issue during the Class Period ranged from 24 to 3,684 per issue, an 
average of 69, a median of 282. The percentage of days on which the trades occurred and the issue was outstanding 
falls between 1% (11 days) to 36% (132 days), with an average of 12.2% and a median of 9.71%.” Enron, 529 F. 
Supp. 2d at 756.  
128 These figures are computed based on the data given in Declaration of John Finnerty, supra note 117, at Exhibit P.   
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suggest the AIG Debt Securities traded in an efficient market.  Efficient markets, in the absence 
of information releases, have sufficient liquidity to absorb large amounts of trading volume 
without large price fluctuations.  These average transaction sizes for the AIG Debt Securities are 
relatively large when compared to other securities.129   This suggests that the AIG Debt 
Securities market was open, developed, and efficient, because it had the necessary liquidity to 
absorb these large transactions.  This also shows there was substantial participation of 
sophisticated institutional traders.  The participation of these institutional traders helps in price 
discovery and the efficiency of the market.130  Moreover, as a proportion of the typical trade size 
the typical search and other costs associated with these large transactions will be small, thus 
reducing the costs of trading. 
3. The Straw Man of Transparency 
The AIG court relied heavily on the concept of market transparency to support its ruling 
that the AIG Notes did not trade in or did not trade “consistent with” an efficient market.131  The 
court concluded, “that during the period in which AIG's bonds were reported on TRACE, there 
was increased transparency in those markets.”132 That finding, however, begs the question of 
whether those markets were efficient during the period when they were not reported on 
TRACE.133   
                                                            
129 See, e.g., In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Lit. CV-03-BE-1500-S. (N.D. Ala. 2009) at 32. (“The average dollar 
value of a single note transaction ranged from $500,000 to $1.5 million.”). 
130 See Ekkehard Boehmer and Eric Kelly, Institutional Investors and the Informational Efficiency of Prices, 22 
REV.  FIN. STUD. 3563-3594 (2009). 
131 AIG, 265 F.RD. at 180-81. 
132 Id. at 177. 
133 In contrast to the AIG court the court in  In re Dynex Capital, Inc. Sec. Litig., 05 Civ. 1897 (HB), 2011 WL 
781215, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2011) stated:  “The Second Circuit has approved the use of matrix [or derived] 
prices ‘as long as they are shown to be consistent and reliable proxies for transaction prices.”  This court thus 
concluded that reporting on TRACE is not required and, in fact, reported transaction prices are not required when 
one is examining whether a bond trades in an efficient market.   
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There are several shortcomings to the court’s analysis.  To begin, transparency means 
readily available price and volume information.  For exchange traded securities, exchanges 
collect and disseminate this information at a minimal cost to all interested parties.  For over-the-
counter traded bonds, price and volume information are not available at zero cost.  At a given 
moment, however, this does not mean that interested investors are not communicating, or do not 
or cannot generate transparency (price and volume information for recently completed 
transactions or for future potential trades).  As discussed above, an efficient market does not 
require that price and volume information be available at zero cost.  Emails or a simple telephone 
call or, for that matter, twenty simultaneous emails or telephone calls from the trading floor or a 
view of the computer screen will supply sufficient transparency.  As was shown above, the 
average dollar size of trade ranges from $818,000 for the AIG 0.5% Notes to over $16.0 million 
for the AIG Zero-Coupon Debentures.  Hence, the cost of making a few, twenty or even 
hundreds of telephone calls relative to the dollar volume of typical trade is miniscule on a 
percent basis.  Moreover, the substantial proportion of AIG Debt Security holders would be the 
most sophisticated institutional traders, including insurance companies, hedge funds, mutual 
funds and others who are generally active traders in the corporate bond market.  It would not be 
too costly for bond traders to generate sufficient pricing information or transparency about the 
AIG Debt Securities by contacting the dealers134 and negotiating their best deals with them.   
This analysis is consistent with the findings of other courts.  For example, in Enron, the 
court stated that, “transparency, has not been established as the standard for an informationally 
                                                            
134 See, e.g., In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 639 (N.D. Ala. 2009)  (“Bond traders at large 
institutions who make transactions of six figures or more simply do not trade on insufficient information, or 
information perceived to be unreliable, or on less than all publicly available information. To argue that the investors 
in HealthSouth bonds did not have sufficient publicly available information in making their decisions about buying 
and/or selling HealthSouth bonds, and what would be a reasonable price for those bonds, defies logic and ignores 
the realities of the bond market in which billions of dollars trade hands.”). 
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efficient, over-the-counter bond market.  Obviously ‘transparency’ is relative, involving 
consideration of numerous factors.  No standard of requisite transparency has been established 
by the courts.”135  Broad generalizations about the institutional structure of the over-the-counter 
corporate bond market used to argue that the whole market is not transparent and thus is 
inefficient136 are nonsensical.  Otherwise, this logic would lead to the fallacy that all corporate 
bonds must trade in an inefficient market137 and thus no class of bondholders would be certified 
in class action litigation.  As the HealthSouth court has said, “to exclude over-the-counter 
transactions from the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance would severely limit the 
public policy behind the securities laws.”138  The corporate bond market is $7.4 trillion in size 
and compared to approximately $17.3 trillion in market capitalization of the equities traded on 
NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges as of December 2010.139 Arguments regarding the lack of 
transparency in these markets are not well-founded. 
                                                            
135 In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 529 F.Supp. 2d 644, 767 (S.D. Tex. 2006); see also In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 
F.R.D. 196 (E.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d, Nos. 08-8033, 08-8045, 2011 WL 1125926 (3d Cir. March 29, 2011). 
136 See also HealthSouth, 261 F.R.D. at 639 (“Transparency has not to date been recognized as a requirement for an 
efficient market.  In any event, transparency is relative and relative matters should be compared like to like. In terms 
of the bond market the court, therefore, concludes that the HealthSouth bond market traded on all the publicly 
available information and thus meets the test for informational efficiency.”). 
137 See In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 638-39 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (“The Defendants then argue 
that, unlike stock, bonds do not trade on a formal, impersonal, centralized exchange, like the NYSE; that over-the-
counter transactions are conducted over the phone or by computer; that an investor has to seek out a dealer to get a 
quote on a bond and may in fact receive different quotes from different dealers; and that an investor would thus have 
difficulty determining the prevailing price for a specific corporate bond . . . In effect, the Defendants argue that the 
market for all bonds is inefficient because it does not function like the stock market. If the court were to accept these 
challenges, it would be ‘[d]enying application of fraud on the market to the bond market because it does not operate 
in the same way as a national exchange or trade in the same volume, frequency, or manner as equity on those 
exchanges [and would be like] throwing out oranges because they are not apples.  The Court finds that the issue is 
not whether the market for equity is more efficient than the market for debt securities, but whether the market for 
debt securities is adequately informationally efficient (whether the price reflect[s] all publicly available information) 
to trigger the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance.’’’)) (citations omitted).  
138 HealthSouth, 261 F.R.D. at 639.  Cf. DiRienzo v. Philip Servs. Corp., 294 F.3d 21, 33 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §2, 15 U.S.C. §78b (2006) (“As the statute explaining the need for regulation and 
control of transactions in securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets states, these transactions are ‘affected 
with a national public interest.’”).  
139 In December 2010 the market capitalization of the U.S. stocks traded on the NYSE was $13.394 trillion, while on 
the NASDAQ the value was $3.889 trillion. World Federation of Exchanges Year-To-Date Monthly Statistics, 
http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/ytd-monthly (last visited April 8, 2011).  
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In AIG, there appears to be no direct connection between discussion of transparency in 
the general state of trading in corporate bonds and the activity in AIG Debt Securities in 
particular.  Unfortunately, the discussion of transparency related to the AIG Debt Securities does 
not offer a meaningful standard.  Without a meaningful and quantifiable benchmark, the issue of 
transparency reverts to subjective views.140    
Other courts have determined that the measurable Cammer factors are the appropriate 
benchmarks for both over-the-counter common stocks and corporate bonds.141  These factors are 
important because no standard of requisite measure of transparency has been established by 
either judicial precedent or academic research to define when a security trades in an efficient 
market. 
4.   Analyst Coverage and Corporate Bonds 
Regarding the relevance of the Cammer factor concerning analyst coverage of bonds, the 
AIG court concluded that, “the mere fact that a rating agency rates a bond is not indicative of it 
trading in an efficient market.  Further, . . . none of the industry analysts who examined AIG's 
debt securities discussed either the 0.5% or the Zero-Coupon bonds specifically, but rather 
analyzed AIG's bond ratings and financial performance generally. . . . Accordingly, the second 
                                                            
140 Here, too, the Enron court’s findings are instructive, and demonstrate an unwillingness to jettison longstanding 
and well-accepted standards for unsupported personal preferences:   “The central question under the fraud on the 
market theory is whether the stock price, at the time a plaintiff effected a trade, reflected the ‘misinformation’  
alleged to have been disseminated.”  Enron, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 767 (citing Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 
1282 (D.N.J. 1989)).   
141 See, e.g., AAL High Yield Bond Fund v. Ruttenberg, 229 F.R.D. 676, 684-85 (N.D. Ala. 2005); Enron, 529 F. 
Supp. 2d 644; In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196 (E.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d, Nos. 08-8033, 08-8045, 2011 WL 
1125926 (3d Cir. March 29, 2011); HealthSouth, 261 F.R.D. 616;  Krogman v. Sterrit, 202 F.R.D. 467, 477 (N.D. 
Tex. 2001); In re SCOR Holding (Switz.) AG Litig., 537 F. Supp.2d 556, 574 (S.D. N. Y. 2008); Xcelera.com, 430 
F.3d 503, 511 (1st Cir.2005); Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1990).  
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Cammer factor provides little support to the claimed efficiency of the market for AIG's 0.5% and 
Zero-Coupon bonds.”142 
Financial information for a company will impact the prices of both its stock and bonds.  
An important concern to the bondholders is the overall financial health of the firm, which 
determines the ability of the firm to pay the promised series of coupons and the principal 
amount.  Equity reports provide information on many other financial factors, as well as the 
outlook for stock prices and earnings.  Thus, the equity reports provide vital information on the 
overall health of the firm.143  Although positive equity reports do not necessarily imply higher 
prices for the AIG Notes, negative equity reports could imply lower prices.  In particular, a 
substantial decline in stock prices could serve as an early warning sign for the bondholders.  To 
this extent, both equity and credit reports provide important and useful information for AIG Debt 
Security holders.   
The finding of the AIG court that the analysts’ coverage of the AIG bond ratings and 
general financial performance did not support the claim that the bonds traded in an efficient 
market is inconsistent with the conclusions reached by other courts finding that similar debt 
                                                            
142 AIG, 265 F.R.D. 157, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  The idea that only analyst reports that analyze the individual 
securities that are being evaluated are relevant is dismissed in a recent court ruling where there were no analyst 
reports on the specific bonds, only general reports on the industry. In re Dynex Capital, Inc. Sec. Litig., 05 Civ. 
1897 (HB), 2011 WL 781215, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2011) (“Nonetheless, Defendants’ expert is unable to rebut 
the assertion that, in the context of the market for manufactured home bonds, there were enough reports throughout 
the Class Period to provide a sufficient amount of information to satisfy this factor.”).  
143 See In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196, 215 (E.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d, Nos. 08-8033, 08-8045, 2011 WL 
1125926 (3d Cir. March 29, 2011) (“Though equity analyst coverage is not a perfect substitute for debt analyst 
coverage, the equity reports nevertheless provided substantial information to the Senior Notes investors. Such 
information, particularly forecasts of DVI’s financial prospects and condition, would likewise have allowed bond 
investors to better understand DVI’s risk profile and its potential for default.”); see also HealthSouth, 261 F.R.D. at 
635 (“The coverage by analysts of HealthSouth’s equities also provided information of interest to the bond market 
when concerned with the overall financial health of the issuing firm. …The extensive coverage of HealthSouth in 
general and its bonds in particular by investment professionals, public media, and institutional investors reflects that 
HealthSouth notes traded in an efficient market.”). 
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securities traded in efficient markets.144  In AIG, twenty analysts followed the company.145 
Throughout the Enron Class Period, spanning from October 19, 1998 to November 27, 2001, for 
example, twenty-nine to thirty-one different analysts prepared reports.146  In HealthSouth, twenty 
different analysts prepared over 300 reports.147  In DVI only three analysts provided continuous 
coverage, issuing over 80 reports.148  Thus, based on this Cammer factor, when compared to the 
findings of other courts, the evidence supports the conclusion that the AIG Debt Securities 
similarly traded in an efficient market. 
C. Applying the Price-Related Factor to the Bond Market  
The fifth factor listed by the Cammer court relating to whether securities trade in an 
efficient market involves a showing of empirical facts demonstrating a cause and effect 
relationship between unexpected corporate events and a response in the stock price.149  
According to the U.S. Supreme Court in Basic, “the fraud on the market theory is based on the 
hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of a company’s stock is 
determined by the available material information regarding the company and its business.” 150 As 
described above, bond pricing theory asserts that in an efficient market factors other than 
information regarding the company and its business are important determinants of the price of a 
company’s corporate bond.   
                                                            
144 See, e.g., Enron, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 768 (concluding that plaintiffsmade a prima facie showing that Enron 
Registered Bonds and Preferred Securities did trade in an efficient secondary market”); DVI, 249 F.R.D. at 216 
(finding that “DVI’s Senior Notes traded in an efficient market); AAL, 229 F.R.D. at 685 (holding that “Plaintiffs 
have made a sufficient showing of market efficiency to invoke the rebuttable presumption of reliance under [the 
‘fraud on the market’ theory]”). 
145 Declaration of John D. Finnerty, Ph. D. in Support of Lead Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification at ¶ 20, In re 
American Int’l Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 04 Civ. 8141 (DAB)). 
146 Enron, 529 F.Supp. 2d at 760 (S.D. Tex. 2006).  
147 HealthSouth, 261 F.R.D. at 635. 
148 DVI, 249 F.R.D. 196. 
149 Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1287 (D.N.J. 1989). 




Understanding cause-effect in the bond market is not intuitive and it can be source of 
confusion.  First, establishing a priori the market expectations is difficult for any securities 
market, let alone the bond market.  What is generally considered to be good news in the stock 
market may be neutral or even bad news in the bond market.  Similarly, what is generally 
considered to be bad news for the stock market may again be neutral or even good news for the 
bond market.  Moreover, for a given event the courts have understood, bond market reaction will 
generally be less responsive and may depend on the content and importance of the event.151   
For example, in HealthSouth, the court found, “The price of bonds reacts differently to 
unexpected new information than does the price of stocks.  Information that may be material to a 
stock price, such as the announcement of a dividend, may not be material for a bond investor 
whose fixed return would not be affected.  In contrast, the price of bonds may be affected by 
general, non-company specific information, such as changes in risk-free interest rates that would 
not affect stock prices.”152  
                                                            
151 See In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196, 216 (E.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d, Nos. 08-8033, 08-8045, 2011 WL 
1125926 (3d Cir. March 29, 2011) ( “Lead Plaintiffs have established a sufficient cause and effect relationship to 
support a finding that the release of new public information affected the price of the Senior Notes. This finding is 
strengthened by the fact that, though debt securities are typically less responsive to new public information, there 
exists a high level of correlation between the Senior Notes’ price changes and identifiable news events.”).  See also 
Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-
Market-Theory, 42 STANFORD L.REV. 1059, 1085 (April 1990) (noting that “not all corporate information will affect 
all securities of a given issuer in the same way. Debt securities will be more insulated from the shocks associated 
with bad news than will equity securities.”).   
152 HealthSouth, 261 F.R.D. at 635-36.  See Robert C. Merton, On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk 
Structure of Interest Rates, 29 J. FIN. 449-70 (1974).  The key element to stock and bond pricing  theory is that both 
common stock and bonds may be viewed as options on the underlying assets of the corporation. Given limited 
liability, common shareholders have the option to default or pay off the bondholders in full when debt becomes due.  
If, when the debt matures, the value of the assets is less than the payment required to the bondholders, then 
shareholders will prefer to default and leave the assets to the bondholders.   Otherwise, the shareholders will prefer 
to pay off the bondholders (by repaying the principal amount of the debt) and ‘purchase’ the assets from the 
bondholders. Hence, we can view the common shareholders’ claims on the firm as a call option on the assets with an 
exercise price equal to the face value of the bonds (i.e., the amount it takes to repay the principal amount of the 
debt).  Similarly, the value of the bonds can be viewed as the value of the assets minus a call option on the assets. 
Viewed from this perspective, stock price and bond prices need not move in the same direction.  As stated by 
Moody’s which has commercialized Dr. Merton’s model, this theory suggests that “the default probability of the 
firm determines the default probability for all of the firm's debt or counterparty obligations. However, the loss in the 
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Two examples will clarify this point.  If a firm is doing well and therefore the probability 
that it will default on its debt obligations is negligible, good news for the stock may be neutral 
news for the bonds because there is no upside earnings potential for the bonds.  Similarly, bad 
news for the stock may be neutral news for the bonds if it does not affect the probability the firm 
will default on its debt obligations.  Also, although the stock market would likely react positively 
to unexpected dividend increases, bond market prices may react positively to small dividends, 
but negatively to large dividends.153  Hence, every announcement may be unique (small 
dividends being good news but large dividends being bad news for bondholders) and, therefore, 
confounding events with ambiguous offsetting effects make it difficult to isolate and predict a 
priori the specific effects on bond prices of a specific news announcement.   
 There are two widely accepted hypotheses regarding the differential impact on bond and 
stock prices:  (1) the information-effect hypothesis and (2) the wealth redistribution hypothesis. 
First, “[a]ccording to the information-effect hypothesis, changes in financial leverage convey 
management’s expectations about the firm’s prospects.”154  The information-effect hypothesis, 
sometimes referred to as the information-content hypothesis or the signaling theory, suggests that 
disclosures by firms that indicate improved prospects, all else constant, indicate greater cash 
flows.  This suggests that stock prices and bond prices will move in tandem.   
                                                                                                                                                                                               
event of default for each of the classes of obligations can vary widely depending on their nature (security, collateral, 
seniority, etc.).”  See PETER CROSBIE & JEFF BOHN, MODELING DEFAULT RISK: MODELING METHODOLOGY 5 
(Moody’s KMV Company 2003), available at http://www.moodyskmv.com/research/singleObligor_wp.html. 
153 George Handjinicolaou & Avner Kalay, Wealth Redistributions or Changes in Firm Value:  An Analysis of 
Returns to Bondholders and Stockholders Around Dividend Announcements, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 35 (1984).   Also, 
Dhillon and Johnson find that stock prices and bond prices react in the opposite directions to dividend 
announcements.  Stock prices increase by 0.98% while bond prices decline by 0.37% for dividend increases.  For 
dividend decreases, stock prices decline by 2.01% while bond prices increase by 0.69%.  See Uphinder S. Dhillon & 
Herb Johnson, The Effect of Dividend Changes on Stock and Bond Prices, 49 J. FIN. 281(1994).   
154 Marcia Millon Cornett & Nickolaos G. Travlos, Information Effects Associated with Debt-for-Equity and Equity-
for-Debt Exchange Offers, 44  J. FIN. 451, 453 (1989). 
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Second, “[t]he wealth redistribution hypothesis . . .  differs from the information content 
hypothesis by stating that an increase (decrease) in the equity market value is accompanied by a 
decrease (increase) in the debt market value.”155  Thus, “the wealth redistribution hypothesis 
predicts offsetting changes in the values of individual classes of securities and no change in firm 
value.”156  This means that stock and bond price movements will be inversely related.  
Thus, in general, any corporate disclosure must be carefully examined to determine 
whether it is negative for both bonds and stocks.  An extreme hypothetical example will make 
this clear.  Suppose Company A stock trades for $100 and its bonds trade at $50. There are $1.0 
million in bonds that are expected to mature in five years and upon maturity bondholders will be 
paid $100 per bond.  Next assume that after some period of time the Company announces it is 
really a shell corporation with only $1.0 million in cash.  Further, assume that this triggers a 
violation in the bond covenants and requires immediate repayment of the debt at face value (i.e., 
$100).  In this case, assuming no litigation, in an efficient market bond pricing theory would 
predict that the bond price would shoot up toward $100 and that the stock price would fall 
toward $0.  That they move in opposite directions is a sign that the two securities trade in 
efficient markets. 
As it relates to the AIG matter, consider the following extreme hypothetical situation.  
Assume Company B, a large company with assets of $1.0 billion has equity worth $100 per share 
with its $1.0 million of AAA-rated bonds trading at par value or $100.  For each of the next four 
quarters the company’s performance exceeds expectations and when it discloses the positive 
news the stock increases by 10%.  Would a bondholder be concerned that the price of the bond 
                                                            
155 George Handjinicolaou & Avner Kalay, Wealth redistributions or changes in firm value: an analysis of returns 
to bondholders and stockholders around dividend announcements, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 35, 38 (1984) (citations omitted). 
156 Ronald W. Masulis, The Effects of Capital Structure Change on Security Prices: A Study of Exchange Offers, 8 J. 
FIN. ECON.139, 143 (1980). 
39 
 
trading at par value did not increase upon these disclosures?  Would we conclude that the bond 
traded in an inefficient market?  The answers are no to both of these questions.  In an efficient 
market bond pricing theory would not predict that the bond price would increase upon the 
positive disclosures.  Furthermore, that the firm-specific information has no impact on the bond 
price is not an indication that the bond trades in an inefficient market.  
This example can be taken a step further.  Assume that the Federal Reserve Bank 
announces an effort to generate higher interest rates, which leads to a large increase in Treasury 
rates.  This will result in Company B’s bonds falling in value as investors are able to secure 
higher returns from Treasury instruments.  That the bond prices fall and the stock price goes up 
or does not change is not an indication that the bond trades in an inefficient market. 
Finally, assume that Company B discloses that it is going bankrupt and will not be 
repaying the principal on its bonds.  In this case the bond and stock prices will both fall, likely to 
zero.  That up until that disclosure date the bond did not respond to firm-specific information, yet 
with this disclosure it does respond to firm-specific information, does not suggest the bond trades 
in an inefficient market.  Instead  the losses to the bondholders can be directly linked to the 
bankruptcy disclosure even though bond prices failed to react to prior firm-specific disclosures. 
The relationship between price movements of the AIG Debt Securities and the AIG stock 
was also affected by the bond covenants.  Holders of AIG’s 0.5% Notes had the right to 
exchange each of their Notes with a face value of $1,000 for the cash value of 7.17523 shares of 
AIG stock.157  The 0.5% Notes were initially issued with a 20.6% conversion premium.  This 
value corresponds to a conversion price of $139.37 for the Notes.  Following a 3-for-2 stock split 
                                                            
157 Hence, conversion ratio for the 0.5% Notes is 7.17523. 
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on July 31, 2000, the conversion price was adjusted to a price of $92.91 and the conversion ratio 
was increased to 10.7628, thus reaching a cash value equivalent to 10.7628 shares of AIG stock.  
The AIG Zero-Coupon Debentures were initially priced at 65.801% of the face value.  These 
debentures had a conversion ratio of 6.0627, thus convertible into 6.0627 shares of AIG common 
stock, which was increased to 9.0942 shares of AIG common stock after the 3-for-2 stock split 
on July 31, 2000.  Thus, the initial conversion price for the Zero-Coupon Debentures was 
$108.53 (or a post-split conversion price of $72.35).   
Exhibits 3 and 4 show both bond prices as well as conversion values, which represent the 
value of common shares the bonds were convertible into.  In the early part of the Class Period, 
the conversion values of the AIG Debt Securities based on AIG’s split-adjusted common stock 
price stayed near or above these conversion prices, thus the conversion options for AIG Debt 
Securities were in-the-money.  For instance, as shown in Exhibit 3, AIG common stock prices 
averaged $94.79, $96.75 and $98.33 during October, November and December 2000, 
respectively (post-split period).  Thus, the conversion option for the 0.5% Note was significantly 
in-the-money during this three-month period.  For this reason, bond pricing theory predicts that 
in an efficient market the 0.5% Note would be expected to be sensitive to AIG common stock 
price movements in this early part of the Class Period.  In fact, the prices of both AIG Debt 
Securities would be expected to reflect most of the changes in the stock price of AIG when they 
were close to or in-the-money.   
As shown in Exhibit 3, during the period of Corrective Disclosures starting on October 
14, 2004 to April 1, 2005, the conversion values on the 0.5% Notes based on AIG’s split-
adjusted common stock price (trading around $60 or less) remained well below the 0.5% Note 
prices, thus the conversion options for these Notes were out-of-the-money.  As shown in Exhibit 
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4, during the period of Corrective Disclosures starting on October 14, 2004 to April 1, 2005 (the 
“Corrective Disclosure Period”), the conversion values on the Zero-Coupon Debentures based on 
AIG’s split-adjusted common stock price (trading around $60-$65) generally remained at or 
below the Debenture prices, thus the conversion options for these Debentures were mostly out-
of-the-money.  In the ten months prior to the Disclosures, the conversion option on the Zero-
Coupon Debenture was mostly at- or in-the money, and would be expected to have exhibited 
sensitivity to AIG stock price movements and disclosures to firm-specific information.  
However, bond pricing theory would predict that in the Corrective Disclosure Period, in an 
efficient market, the prices of the AIG Debt Securities would behave similar to straight, non-
convertible, investment grade Debentures, and therefore they would not exhibit as much 
sensitivity to AIG stock price movements and disclosures to firm-specific information that did 















































































































































































American International Group (AIG)
Split-Adjusted Conversion Value vs. Weighted-Average Price of 0.5% Note1
May 11, 2000 - April 1, 2005
Weighted-Average Price of Note Split-Adjusted Conversion Value
Note: 1 CUSIP: 026874AN7




Data unavailable from 5/11/00 -
11/13/01.  Par of $100 shown 





1.  Bonds Versus Stocks in Event Studies and Examining Returns 
Even though there were distinctly separate periods where bond pricing theory would 
predict different relationships between the price movements of the AIG Debt Securities and AIG 
stock prices, Lead Plaintiffs presented a simple, linear regression analysis in an attempt to 
demonstrate that returns to the AIG Debt Securities reacted to value-relevant or firm-specific 
information.158  Lead Plaintiffs’ expert witness separately regressed each of the returns of the 
two AIG Debt Securities against AIG stock returns during the entire Class Period.159  For both of 
the AIG Debt Securities, he found strong positive correlations between the returns of the AIG 
Debt Securities and the returns to AIG’s stock.  The adjusted R-square, used to measure the 
                                                            
158 In re American Int’l Group, Inc. Sec. Litig, 265 F.R.D. 157, 182-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
159 In the expert reports, there is no description of the data used in the regression analysis.  Therefore, it is unclear 
what sources of price and return data were used.  It is also unclear whether the analysis utilized transaction prices for 
the AIG Debt Securities with variable holding periods or whether the analysis relied upon matrix prices and daily 
































































































































































































American International Group (AIG)
Split-Adjusted Conversion Value vs. 
Weighted-Average Price of Zero Coupon Debenture1
November 9, 2001 - April 1, 2005
Weighted-Average Price of Note Split-Adjusted Conversion Value
Note: 1CUSIP: 026874AP2
Source: Bloomberg and TRACE.  Bloomberg data is used for the Zero Coupon Debenture from 11/9/01- 6/28/02. TRACE data for the Debenture is used for 7/1/02 - 4/29/05. 
Zero Coupon Debenture Split-Adjusted Conversion Value
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proportion of the stock returns that explain the returns to the debt, was 50%.  In other words, he 
concluded that AIG’s stock returns explained half of the AIG Debt Securities returns.  The t-
statistics for the regression coefficients on the stock return variable, used to measure their 
statistical significance, ranged between 22.5 and 29.4, leaving no doubt about their statistical 
significance or importance for explaining the variation in the returns of the AIG Debt Securities.  
Thus, using a simple linear regression, it was demonstrated that the returns of the AIG Debt 
Securities reacted to firm-specific disclosures or value-relevant information during the Class 
Period.  
Without, however, an understanding of why stock and bond prices might move in the 
same direction or inversely or why certain information might have a significant effect on one of 
the securities and not the other, it is easy to see why the court concluded these results did not 
warrant a finding of market efficiency.  What was not incorporated into the analysis was the 
critical role the convertibility of the AIG Debt Securities played in the regression analysis.  
Because, as discussed above, the convertibility option moved in- and out-of-the-money during 
the Class Period, careful analysis would have required an explicit modeling of the convertibility 
option to be included in the regression.  Thus, on October 14, 2004, the AIG stock price was 
$60.19 per share, while the bond prices of the 0.5% Note and the Zero-Coupon Debentures were 
$95.625 and $66.60, respectively.  On October 14, 2004, the 0.5% Note was out-of-the-money 
with a conversion value of $64.78, while the Zero-Coupon Debenture was in-the-money with a 
conversion value of $54.74.  Therefore, there was no reason that the 0.5% Note should have 
traded, unless the disclosure had an impact on AIG’s likelihood of defaulting on its debt 
obligations.  Lead Plaintiffs’ evidence omitted this critical feature by presenting a simple, linear 
regression.   
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Because the changing values of the conversion option were not incorporated in the 
regression analysis presented to the court, the overly-simplistic linear regression results are not 
applicable to the required statistical tests for the entire Class Period.  The linear regression results 
suggest that on average AIG Debt Securities prices reacted in a similar way as AIG stock prices 
to firm-specific information, due to the convertibility of the AIG Debt Securities.  As described 
above, when the AIG stock price traded above the conversion prices of the AIG Debt Securities 
(as it did early in the Class Period), the conversion option was in the money and AIG Debt 
Securities prices would be expected to move almost one-to-one with the AIG stock price 
movements.  Moreover, when AIG stock prices traded significantly below the conversion prices 
of the AIG Debt Securities (as they did starting with the Disclosure Period), the conversion 
option is out-of-the-money and, especially for investment grade bonds, bond prices would not be 
expected to move much if at all in unison with the AIG stock price movements.  In other words, 
during the Disclosure Period, the AIG Debt Securities were similar to straight, investment grade, 
non-convertible bonds.  Thus, the average relation between Common Stock price and Note prices 
measured over the entire Class Period is not a good estimate of the dynamic relation between 
prices of Notes and Common Stock during the Disclosure Period.160 
Thus, bond pricing theory predicts that in an efficient market, economy-wide factors 
rather than firm-specific factors would have had a greater impact on bond returns on October 14, 
2004.  Given that the firm-specific information disclosed on October 14 would not have affected 
                                                            
160 We did not have access to price data for the AIG Debt Securities for the Class Period used by the experts so we 




AIG’s likelihood of default, in an efficient market bond pricing theory would predict that there 
would not be linear price movements for AIG Debt Securities – exactly what was observed.161    
Finally, the AIG court’s conclusion that, “on two of the four dates that he measured the 
change in bond prices, the 0.5% bonds did not trade at all; a finding that Dr. Cox opined, and the 
Court agrees, is not indicative of market efficiency”162 was reached without sufficient 
background information.163  As demonstrated above, if there was disclosure of firm-specific 
information, but that information did not impact the firm’s probability of default on that 
instrument, then unless there was additional information or changes in investors’ opinions related 
to the firm’s fixed income securities, there would be no trading, on average, in the bonds in an 
efficient market.164  Without an analysis of the probability of default, there is no empirical or 
theoretical support from which to reach a conclusion regarding efficiency.  
Conclusion 
There are important differences between the stock market and the bond market when 
analyzing the fraud-on-the-market theory.  Although the Cammer factors can be used to analyze 
bond market efficiency, they require adjustments to account for differences between stock and 
                                                            
161 During the early part of the Class Period, while the AIG Debt Securities were close-to or in-the-money, their 
prices would have been sensitive to common stock prices, and thus the return volatilities of AIG Debt Securities 
would have been directly driven by the volatility of the AIG common stock returns.  During the later Corrective 
Disclosure Period, because the conversion options for AIG Debt Securities were out of the money, AIG Debt 
Securities returns would no longer be driven by AIG Common Stock returns, and the return volatility, as investment 
grade bonds, AIG Debt Securities would have been substantially less.  A proper regression analysis would have 
adjusted the standard errors of the regression used to estimate the statistical significance of the AIG Debt Securities 
excess returns during the Disclosure Period (such as on October 14, 2004, etc.).   
162 AIG, 265 F.R.D. at 179. 
163 In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Dynex court observed there was no trading for at least 57 days after the 
corrective disclosure, however, based on the subsequent movements of the matrix prices (not necessarily transaction 
prices) that followed 57 days later, it held that there was support for immediate cause-and-effect. In re Dynex 
Capital, Inc. Sec. Litig., 05 Civ. 1897 (HB), 2011 WL 781215, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2011). 
164 We believe it was error  to conclude that “[t]he lack of sales [was] inconsistent with the theory of an efficient 
market, and thus . . . that [Lead Plaintiffs’ expert had not] provided a credible explanation for the reason that no 
0.5% bonds were sold on two of the AIG-related news days.” AIG, 265 F.R.D. at 180. 
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bond markets, such as the domination of institutional trading activity in bond markets and bond 
covenants that complicate simple pricing models.   Failure to account for these and other 
differences will lead to significant confusion about the application of the Cammer factors when 
evaluating market efficiency in class certification.  
After its examination of the five factors listed by the court in Cammer and the bid-ask 
spread, identified by a court subsequent to Cammer, 165 as well as the alleged lack of 
transparency in the market, the AIG court determined the evidence did not support a conclusion 
that the AIG Debt Securities traded in open, developed and efficient markets.166  The court thus 
ruled against certification of the class of AIG bondholders.167  Unfortunately, this analysis failed 
to account for the critical distinctions between the market for corporate stocks and corporate 
bonds.  Careful application of bond pricing theory requires adjustments to a Cammer-type 
examination of turnover and the relative transaction sizes, frequency of trade, as well as analyst 
reporting and cause-and-effect to accommodate the salient differences between bonds and stocks.  
Taking into account these differences yields a contrary conclusion than that reached by the AIG 
court – namely, that the AIG Debt Securities traded in open, developed and efficient markets.  
Furthermore, as demonstrated above, with proper adjustments, the Cammer factors can and 
should be applied to the corporate bond market.   
The impending inclusion in the class action litigation arena of hundreds of billions of 
dollars of new and more complex securities, for instance, such structured products as mortgage 
                                                            
165 Krogman supplements the five-factor test from Cammer with an analysis of the bid-ask spread of the security in 
question.  Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 474 (D. Tex. 2001) (citing Serfaty v. Int’l Automated Sys., 180 
F.R.D. 418, 423 (D. Utah 1998); O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479, 503 (W.D. Mich. 1996)).   




backed securities,168 credit default swaps,169 and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs),170  
makes even more important a rigorous theoretical analysis describing the economic and financial 
factors determining the relationship between stock and bond price movements, as well as bond-
to-bond price movements.171  This is because, with these instruments, the complexity of the 
analysis is accentuated relative to corporate bonds.  Furthermore, each structured product is 
unique.172  Thus, even more so than with corporate bonds, it is incumbent upon the courts to 
appropriately adjust application of the Cammer factors to account for how these markets differ 
from the markets for corporate stocks when determining whether to certify a class of security 
holders.  To make their case, it also becomes incumbent on the parties claiming that the 
                                                            
168 The Securities and Exchange Commission defines mortgage-backed securities as follows: "Mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) are debt obligations that represent claims to the cash flows from pools of mortgage loans, most 
commonly on residential property.  Mortgage loans are purchased from banks, mortgage companies, and other 
originators and then assembled into pools by a governmental, quasi-governmental, or private entity.  The entity then 
issues securities that represent claims on the principal and interest payments made by borrowers on the loans in the 
pool, a process known as securitization." http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 
2011).   
169 “Credit Default Swaps are contingent claims with payoffs that are linked to the credit risk of a given entity.  The 
buyer of the CDS receives protection from default risk in exchange for periodic payments (usually quarterly but 
sometimes semi-annually) until the expiration of the contract or until a predefined credit event occurs which, for our 
data, is default by the given entity. In the event of default, the buyer of the CDS spread receives a payoff equal to the 
difference between the face value and the market value of the underlying debt minus the CDS premium which has 
accrued between the default date and the last periodic payment date. In practice, buying a CDS contract is 
tantamount to buying insurance against default where the quarterly premium payments are determined from the 
CDS spreads.”  SANJIV DAS, PAUL HANOUNA & ATULYA SARIN, FUNDAMENTALS-BASED VERSUS MARKET-BASED 
CROSS-SECTIONAL MODELS OF CDS SPREADS (2006), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2006/sept/hanouna_p.pdf (2006). 
170 See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2006) (providing a definition of the term 
“asset-backed security”).  Nomura Securities defines CDOs as follows: “A CDO is similar to a regular mutual fund 
that buys bonds. However, unlike a mutual fund, most of the securities sold from a CDO are themselves bonds, 
rather than shares. In simplest terms, a CDO is an arrangement that raises money primarily by issuing its own bonds 
and then invests the proceeds in a portfolio of bonds, loans, or similar assets. Payments on the portfolio are the main 
source of funds for repaying the CDO's own securities.”   See NOMURA SECURITIES INTERNATIONAL, INC., CDO’S IN 
PLAIN ENGLISH (2004), available at http://www.vinodkothari.com/Nomura_cdo_plainenglish.pdf.    
171 According to Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the notional principal of outstanding over-the-counter 
derivatives issued in G10 countries in 2010 exceeded $600 trillion.  The market value of these derivatives is 
estimated to be around $25 trillion (of which about $7 trillion is issued in the U.S.)  Both of these amounts would 
easily dwarf most other capital markets.  See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, AMOUNTS OUTSTANDING OF 
OVER-THE-COUNTER (OTC) DERIVATIVES, available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf;  BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL ANNEX, available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa1103.pdf#page=104. 




securities trade in efficient markets to present a thorough theoretical analysis in combination 
with reporting, explaining and interpreting their empirical results.  Litigation related to CDOs 
and other structured investment products is well underway.173  The size of these markets are 
comparable to the $7.4 trillion corporate bond market174 points to the importance of properly 
adjusting the Cammer factors based on the underlying financial theory.   
The AIG decision also raises significant issues of public policy.  As described by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, private securities-fraud class actions are “an essential supplement to criminal 
prosecutions and civil enforcement actions,”175 that “deter[] fraud” and “maintain public 
confidence in the marketplace.”176  Thus, the decision in AIG has much broader implications than 
simply failing to allow the AIG Debt Securities holders to have their day in court.  It may 
negatively affect a significant mechanism to deter fraud in the market place for all debt 
instruments. 
                                                            
173 See generally Wells Fargo Mortgage-Backed Certificates Litig., No. 09 Civ. 1376 (LHK) (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 
27, 2010); In re Wachovia Corp. Preferred Sec. & Bond/Notes Litig., No. 09 Civ. 6351 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 23, 
2011); In re Morgan Stanley Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Litig., No. 09 Civ. 2137 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. filed 
Nov. 22, 2010); Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., No. 08 Civ. 10841 (JSR) 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 1, 2010); Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 
01110 (HB) (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 12, 2011); Bear Stearns Mortgage Pass-Through Litig., No. 08 Civ. 8093 (LTS) 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 23, 2009); Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. No. 10 Civ. 7497 (JM) (S.D.N.Y. filed 
Sept. 30, 2010). 
174 BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, AMOUNTS OUTSTANDING OF OVER-THE-COUNTER (OTC) 
DERIVATIVES, available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf. 
175 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007). 
176 Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005). 
